A Tarskian Informal Semantics for Answer Set Programming by Denecker, Marc et al.
A Tarskian Informal Semantics for Answer Set
Programming∗
Marc Denecker1, Yuliya Lierler2, Miroslaw Truszczynski2, and
Joost Vennekens3
1 Department of Computer Science, K.U. Leuven
3001 Heverlee, Belgium
marc.denecker@cs.kuleuven.be
2 Department of Computer Science, University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506-0633, USA
yuliya|mirek@cs.uky.edu
3 Campus De Nayer | Lessius Mechelen | K.U. Leuven
2860 Sint-Katelijne-Waver, Belgium
joost.vennekens@cs.kuleuven.be
Abstract
In their seminal papers on stable model semantics, Gelfond and Lifschitz introduced ASP by
casting programs as epistemic theories, in which rules represent statements about the knowledge
of a rational agent. To the best of our knowledge, theirs is still the only published systematic
account of the intuitive meaning of rules and programs under the stable semantics. In current
ASP practice, however, we find numerous applications in which rational agents no longer seem
to play any role. Therefore, we propose here an alternative explanation of the intuitive meaning
of ASP programs, in which they are not viewed as statements about an agent’s beliefs, but as
objective statements about the world. We argue that this view is more natural for a large part
of current ASP practice, in particular the so-called Generate-Define-Test programs.
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1 Introduction
The key postulate of declarative programing is that programs reflect the way information
about a domain of discourse is described in natural language. The syntax must align with
linguistic patterns we use and the formal semantics must capture the way we understand
them. To put it differently, a declarative programming formalism (logic) must have an
informal semantics, an intuitive and precise link between the formal syntax and semantics
of the logic, and informal intended meanings of natural language expressions describing
the “real world”. This informal semantics explains what programs mean or, in other words,
provides programs with an informal but precise natural language reading.
Having an informal semantics is important to a declarative programming formalism. It
facilitates effective coding by offering intuitions to guide the programmer, and provides a
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basis for the programming methodology. It promotes understanding of code and helps in
teaching how to program. It suggests extensions of the logic to facilitate expressing new
types of knowledge, and it helps explain the relationship to other logics. The postulate is
essential anywhere the emphasis on declarativeness is paramount, in particular, in addition
to declarative programming, also in knowledge representation and database query languages
and, more generally, in all contexts where we need to think how information about a domain
of discourse has been or is to be encoded in a logic.
First-order (FO) logic has a clear informal semantics aligned with the classical Tarskian
formal semantics of the logic. Indeed, the constructors of the FO language directly correspond
to natural language connectives and expressions “for all” and “there is”. The formal Tarskian
semantics of these syntactic constructors is given by interpretations (structures), which are
abstract mathematical representations of informally understood “possible objective state of
affairs,” and it literally reflects the informal understanding of the natural language connectives
and quantifying expressions. It is that informal semantics that makes FO sentences legible
and their intended meaning clear, and is largely responsible for the widespread use of FO
logic in declarative programming, knowledge representation and database query languages.
Our main goal in this work is to analyze the role of informal semantics in the development
of answer set programming (ASP) and its effective use. The key step is to clarify what
informal semantics we have in mind. According to the intuitions Gelfond and Lifschitz
exploited when introducing the stable-model (answer-set) semantics [10, 11], a program is a
formal representation of a set of epistemic propositions believed by a rational introspective
agent, and stable models of the program represent that agent’s belief sets. This epistemic
informal semantics linked ASP to autoepistemic logic by Moore [16] and default logic by
Reiter [20], and supported applications in nonmonotonic reasoning. However, the epistemic
perspective does not seem to be relevant to the way ASP is predominantly used now, as
a formalism for modeling search problems [14, 17]. We argue that for such use of ASP a
Tarskian informal semantics, not unlike the one for the FO logic, fits the bill better.
Interestingly, while the Tarskian informal semantics of ASP seems to have been implicitly
followed by a vast majority of ASP users, it has never been explicitly identified or analyzed.
We do so in this paper. We describe that informal semantics and show how it explains the
way ASP developed and how it is intimately related to the currently dominating form of ASP,
the generate-define-test (GDT) ASP [12]. We point out how the Tarskian informal semantics
connects GDT ASP with the logic FO(ID). We argue that taking the Tarskian informal
semantics seriously strongly suggests that the language of GDT ASP can be streamlined
while in the same time generalizing the current one.
We present the Tarskian informal semantics for ASP in the context of a more general
formalism, which we introduce first. We call it first-order answer set programming of ASP-
FO for short. ASP-FO can be viewed as a modular first-order generalization of GDT ASP
with unrestricted interpretations as models, with open and closed domains, non-Herbrand
functions, and FO constraints and rule bodies. It is closely connected to the logic FO(ID)
[3, 6] and has formal connections to the equilibrium logic [18]. ASP-FO generalizes GDT
ASP and so the informal semantics we develop for ASP-FO applies to GDT ASP, too.
2 Generate-Define-Test methodology
GDT is an effective methodology to encode search problems in ASP. In GDT, a programmer
conceives the problem as consisting of three parts: generate, define and test [12]. The
role of generate is to generate the search space. Nowadays this is often encoded by a set of
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choice rules:
{A} ← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm, (1)
where A, Bi and Ci are atoms. Such a rule states that atom A can be arbitrarily true or
false, if the condition expressed by the rule’s body holds. This condition may refer to other
generated predicates, or to defined predicates. The define part is a set of definitions of
some auxiliary predicates. Each definition is encoded by a group of rules
A← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm, (2)
where A,Bi, Cj are atoms and A is the auxiliary predicate that is being defined. These
rules describe how to derive the auxiliary predicates from the generated predicates or from
other defined predicates, typically in a deterministic way. Finally, the test part eliminates
generated answer sets that do not satisfy desired constraints. They are represented by
constraint rules:
← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm, (3)
A set of these three types of rules will be called a GDT program.
For instance, the GDT-program (4) below encodes the Hamiltonian cycle problem. The
example illustrates that an ASP program conceived in the GDT way typically shows a rich
internal structure.
generate {In(x, y)} ← Edge(x, y).
define Node(V ). . . . Node(W ).
Edge(V, V ′). . . . Edge(W,W ′).
T (x, y)← In(x, y).
T (x, y)← T (x, z), T (z, y).
test ← In(x, y), In(x, z), y 6= z.
← In(x, z), In(y, z), x 6= y.
← Node(x),Node(y), not T (x, y).
(4)
Each of the three parts may again consist of independent components. For instance, test
in the example above consists of three independent constraints; define contains separate
definitions for three predicates Node, Edge and T . This internal structure exists in the mind
of programmers, but is not explicit in ASP programs and often becomes apparent only when
we investigate the dependencies between predicates. This motivates us to define a logic which
does make the internal structure of a GDT-program explicit.
3 Concepts of Tarskian model semantics
A vocabulary Σ is a set of predicate and function symbols, each with a non-negative integer
arity. Terms, formulas and sentences are defined as in FO.
An interpretation (or structure) A of a vocabulary Σ is given by a non-empty set dom(A),
the domain of A, and, for each symbol τ of Σ, a value τA, the interpretation of τ . If τ is an
n-ary function symbol, τA is an n-ary total function over dom(A). If τ is an n-ary predicate
symbol, τA is an n-ary relation over dom(A). If A is an interpretation of a vocabulary Σ, we
call Σ the vocabulary of A and write it as ΣA. An interpretation of the empty vocabulary
consists only of its domain.
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If Σ′ ⊆ ΣA, we define the projection of A on Σ′, written A|Σ′ , to be the interpretation of
Σ′ with the same domain and the same interpretation of each symbol τ ∈ Σ′ as A. We then
also say that A is an extension of its projection A|Σ′ .
Let A and A′ be interpretations of the same vocabulary Σ, having the same domain, and
assigning the same values to every function symbol in Σ. We say that A is a subinterpretation
of A′, written A ⊆ A′, if, for every predicate symbol P of Σ, the relation PA interpreting
this predicate symbol in A is a subset of the corresponding relation PA′ .
A variable assignment θ for an interpretation A assigns to each variable v an element θ(v)
in dom(A). When x is a variable and d an element of dom(A), we write θ[x : d] for a variable
assignment that assigns d to x but is otherwise the same as θ. The interpretation tA,θ of
a term in an interpretation A under variable assignment θ is defined through the standard
induction. As usual, we assume that ∧,∀,⇒ are defined in terms of ¬,∨ and ∃.
I Definition 1 (Satisfiability relation A, θ |= ϕ). Let ϕ be an FOL formula and A a structure
over a vocabulary containing all function and relation symbols in ϕ. We define A, θ |= ϕ by
induction on the structure of ϕ:
– A, θ |= P (t¯) if t¯ A,θ ∈ PA;
– A, θ |= ψ ∨ φ if A, θ |= ψ or A, θ |= φ;
– A, θ |= ¬ψ if A, θ 6|= ψ;
– A, θ |= ∃x ψ if for some d ∈ dom(I), A, θ[x : d] |= ψ.
When ϕ is a sentence (no free variables), then θ is irrelevant and we write A |= ϕ.
In a Tarskian model semantics, a structure represents a potential state of affairs. For
a sentence ϕ and a structure A, A |= ϕ formalizes that ϕ is true in the state of affairs as
given by A. If all we know about the state of affairs is that ϕ is true in it, then a structure
A is a possible state of the world, or a possible world, if and only if A |= ϕ.
4 The logic ASP-FO
We introduce a modular form of ASP to represent the different kind of modules in GDT
programs. We define a G-module, D-module and T-module.
I Definition 2. A choice rule is an expression of the form: ∀x¯ ({P (t¯)} ← ϕ), where ϕ is
an FO formula, P (t¯) is an atom and x¯ includes all free variables appearing in the rule. A
G-module is a set of choice rules with the same predicate in their head.
I Definition 3. A D-module D is a pair 〈Ext,Π〉 where Ext is a set of predicates, called
defined or output predicates, and Π is a set of rules of the form
∀x¯ (P (t¯)← ϕ), (5)
where P (t¯) is an atom with P ∈ Ext, and ϕ is an FO formula with all its free variables
amongst x¯.
For a D-module D, we denote the set of its defined predicate symbols by Ext(D). We
write Par(D) for the set of all other symbols in Π. We call Par(D) the set of parameter or
input symbols. For a set of rules Π, we denote by heads(Π), the set of all predicate symbols
appearing in the head of a rule r ∈ Π. In the following we identify a D-module 〈heads(Π),Π〉
with Π.
I Definition 4. A T-module is an FO sentence.
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I Definition 5. An ASP-FO-theory is a set of G-modules, D-modules and T-modules.
There is an obvious syntactical match between these language constructs and those used
in ASP to express generate, define and test modules. For instance, an ASP constraint (3)
corresponds to the T-module– FO sentence: ∀x¯(¬(B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bn ∧¬C1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Cm)), where
x¯ is the set of variables occurring in (3), and we identify normal rules (2) with the universal
closure of A← B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bn ∧ ¬C1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Cm.
Note that an ASP-FO theory preserves the internal structure of the generate, define
and test parts. For instance, we may write the Hamiltonian cycle theory as:
generate {∀x∀y({In(x, y)} ← Edge(x, y))}
define {V ertex(V )← t, . . . , V ertex(W )← t}
{Edge(V, V ′)← t, . . . , Edge(W,W ′)← t}{
∀x∀y(T (x, y)← In(x, y))
∀x∀y(T (x, y)← In(x, z) ∧ In(z, y))
}
test ∀x∀y∀z¬(In(x, y) ∧ In(x, z) ∧ y 6= z)
∀x∀y∀z¬(In(x, z) ∧ In(y, z) ∧ x 6= y)
∀x∀y(V ertex(x) ∧ V ertex(y)⇒ T (x, y))
(6)
In defining the formal semantics of ASP-FO, we aim to ensure that three conditions are
satisfied. First, the structures are to be viewed as possible worlds, i.e., they should represent
possible states of affairs, not states of belief. We do not restrict to Herbrand interpretations.
Second, to respect the modular structure of an ASP-FO theory, its semantics should be
modular, that is, defined in terms of the semantics of its modules. We therefore simply define
that a structure A is a model of a ASP-FO theory T iff it is a model of each of its modules.
In other words, an ASP-FO theory can be understood as a monotone conjunction of its
modules. Third, as ASP-FO is to reflect the GDT methodology, ASP-FO theories resulting
from GDT programs must have the same meaning.
The definition of satisfaction of a T-module, i.e., an FO sentence, is standard (Definition 1).
It follows that ASP-FO is a conservative extension of FO.
The semantics for a D-module is a generalization of the stable semantics to arbitrary
structures and to FO rule bodies. For reasons explained in the next section, we use the
semantics that was introduced by Pelov et al. [19] and, in the way we follow here, by
Vennekens et al. [22]. It uses a pair of interpretations to simulate the construction of the
Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct.
I Definition 6 (Satisfaction by pairs of interpretations). Let ϕ be an FO formula, A and B
interpretations of all symbols in ϕ having the same domain and assigning the same values to
all function symbols, and let θ be a variable assignment. We define the relation (A,B), θ |= ϕ
by induction on the structure of ϕ:
– (A,B), θ |= P (t¯) if A, θ |= P (t¯),
– (A,B), θ |= ¬ϕ if (B,A), θ 6|= ϕ,
– (A,B), θ |= ϕ ∨ ψ if (A,B), θ |= ϕ or (A,B), θ |= ψ
– (A,B), θ |= ∃xψ if for some d ∈ dom(I), (A,B), θ[x : d] |= ψ.
This truth assignment interprets positive occurrences of atoms in A, and negative occurrences
in B. Indeed, (positive) atoms are interpreted in A, but every occurrence of ¬ switches the
role of A and B.
For two structures A andB that have the same domain and interpret disjoint vocabularies,
A ◦B denotes the structure that interprets the union of the vocabularies of A and B, has
the same domain as A and B, and coincides with A and B on their respective vocabularies.
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I Definition 7 (Parameterized stable-model semantics). For a D-module D, an interpretation
M of Ext(D) is a stable model of D relative to an interpretation Ap of Par(D) ifM is the
least1 of all interpretations A of Ext(D) that have the same domain as Ap, interpret function
symbols in the same way as Ap and for each rule ∀x¯ (P (t¯) ← ϕ) of D and each variable
assignment θ, if (Ap ◦ A,Ap ◦M), θ |= ϕ then A, θ |= P (t¯).
This parameterized stable-model semantics generalizes the original one in three ways:
it is parameterized, i.e., it builds stable models on top of a given interpretation of the
parameter symbols; it handles FO bodies; and it works for arbitrary (not only Herbrand)
interpretations.
I Definition 8. A structure A is a model of a D-module D (notation A |= D) if A|Ext(D) is
a stable model of D relative to A|Par(D).
We now turn our attention to G-modules. We note that the point of a choice rule is to
“open up” certain atoms P (d¯) – to allow them to be true without forcing them to be true.
I Definition 9. A structureM is a model of a G-module G if for each variable assignment
θ such thatM, θ |= P (x¯) there is a choice rule ∀y¯ ({P (t¯)} ← ϕ) in G such that t¯M,θ = x¯θ
andM, θ |= ϕ.
AG-module can be translated to an equivalent singletonG-module, using a process similar
to predicate completion. First, we note that any choice rule ∀x¯ ({P (t¯)} ← ϕ) can be rewritten
as ∀y¯ ({P (y¯)} ← ∃x¯(y¯ = t¯ ∧ ϕ)). Next, any finite set of choice rules ∀x¯ ({P (x¯)} ← ϕi) can
be combined into a single choice rule ∀x¯ ({P (y¯)} ← ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn)). It is straightforward to
show that these transformations are equivalence-preserving. Together with this result, the
following theorem implies that each (finite) G-module is equivalent to an FO sentence. Thus,
G-modules are redundant in ASP-FO, since they can be simulated by T-modules.
I Theorem 10. An interpretationM satisfies a singleton G-module {∀x¯ ({P (x¯)} ← ϕ)} if
and only ifM satisfies ∀x¯ (P (x¯)⇒ ϕ).
For instance, the singleton G-module of the generate part of (4) corresponds to the
following FO sentence: ∀x∀y(In(x, y)⇒ Edge(x, y)).
ASP-FO is an open domain logic with uninterpreted function symbols. Logic programming
and ASP often restrict the semantics to Herbrand interpretations only.
I Definition 11. The Herbrand module over a set σ of function symbols is the expression
H(σ). We say thatM |= H(σ) if dom(M) is the set of variable-free terms that can be built
from σ and for each such term t, tM = t.
Herbrand modules are useful in applications with complete knowledge of the domain.
By adding H(σ) for the set σ of all function symbols of Σ to an ASP-FO theory, we limit
its semantics to Herbrand models of σ. By adding H(σ) for a strict subset σ of function
symbols, the remaining function symbols behave as uninterpreted symbols and take arbitrary
interpretation in the Herbrand universe consisting of the terms of σ. Herbrand modules can
be expressed by means of D- and T-modules (as in the logic FO(ID) [3]). Thus, they are
redundant.
Relationship with FO and ASP. ASP-FO is not only a conservative extension of FO but
also of the basic ASP language of normal programs. Note that a set of normal rules can be
seen as a D-module defining all predicates.
1 The term “least” is understood with respect to the notion of subinterpretation defined earlier. One can
show that such a least interpretation always exists.
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I Theorem 12. For a normal program Π over vocabulary Σ, a structure A is a stable model
of Π if and only if A is a model of the ASP-FO theory {(ΣP ,Π),H(ΣF )}, where ΣP ,ΣF is
the set of all predicate and function symbols of Σ, respectively.
This theorem allows us to represent an entire normal logic program as a single D-module
(and an auxiliary Herbrand module). However, as stated before, what we would like to show
is the equivalence of GDT-programs in ASP and the corresponding ASP-FO theories.
Let us now consider a GDT-program Π consisting of a set of choice rules of form (1),
normal rules of form (2) and constraints of form (3). We define the (positive) predicate
dependency graph of Π as the directed graph with all predicate symbols of Π as its vertices
and with an edge from P to Q whenever P appears in the head of a rule and Q occurs
positively in the body of that rule (i.e., in the scope of an even number of negations).
Without loss of generality we assume that each predicate of Π appears in the head of at
least one of its rules. By heads(Π) we denote the set of all predicate symbols appearing in
the heads of the rules of the form (1) or (2) in Π. A partition Π0, . . . ,Πn of Π is a splitting2
of Π if:
– for each i, Πi is either a singleton containing a constraint, the set of all choice rules for
some predicate P , or a normal logic program;
– heads(Πi) ∩ heads(Πj) = ∅ for i 6= j;
– for any strongly connected component S of the predicate dependency graph of Π, S ⊆
heads(Πi) for some i;
– for any predicate symbol P occurring in the head of some choice rule in Π there is no
edge from P to P in the predicate dependency graph of Π.
We can identify each Πi in a splitting with an ASP-FO module in the obvious way: a
Πi that consists of a constraint corresponds to a T-module, a Πi consisting of choice rules
corresponds to a G-module, and a Πi consisting of normal rules corresponds to a D-module.
I Theorem 13. For a GDT-program Π, if Π0, . . . ,Πn is a splitting of Π, then an interpret-
ationM is answer set of Π if and only ifM is a model of {M0, . . . ,Mn,H(Σ)}, where each
Mi is the ASP-FO module corresponding to Πi.
For instance, the horizontal lines within generate, define, and test parts of the
Hamiltonian cycle program (4) identify a partition that satisfies the conditions of a splitting.
Theorem 13 states that the answer sets of (4) coincide with models of the ASP-FO theory (6).
The practice of ASP demonstrates that the vast majority of GDT programs admit a
splitting. Theorem 13 shows that ASP-FO (i) extends this fragment of ASP in a direct way,
and (ii) interprets those ASP programs as the monotone conjunction of their components.
Theorem 13 fails to take into account three common extensions of the ASP language:
aggregates (or weight expressions), disjunction in the head, and strong negation. Each of
these limitations can be lifted (we do not discuss the details due to space restrictions).
Relation to FO(ID). A theory in FO(ID) is a set of FO sentences and inductive definitions.3
These definitions are syntactically identical to D-modules of ASP-FO, but are interpreted
under a two-valued parameterized variant of the well-founded semantics, rather than the
parameterized stable-model semantics used in ASP-FO.
I Definition 14. A Σ-interpretation A is a model of an FO(ID) definition ∆ (notation
A |= ∆) if A|Ext(D) is the well-founded model of ∆ relative to A|Par(D), as defined in [7].
2 The conditions on splitting follow the requirements stated in the Symmetric Splitting Theorem in [9].
3 Some versions of FO(ID) allow also boolean combinations of FO formulas and definitions [6].
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Denecker and Ternovska [6] introduced the notion of a total definition. An FO(ID)
definition is total if it has only two-valued well-founded models and hence expresses a total,
deterministic function from Par(D)-interpretations to Ext(D)-interpretations. Syntactic
conditions such as no negative occurrences of defined symbols in the bodies of rules (defining
the class of positive definitions), predicate stratification and local stratification all guarantee
that a definition is total. Thus, many definitions occurring in practice are total. For total
definitions (D-modules), the well-founded and stable models coincide [19]. Consequently, the
logics ASP-FO and FO(ID) restricted to total definitions (D-modules) coincide, too.
Looking back at the ASP-FO theory for the Hamiltonian circuit program, we see that all
three of its D-modules are positive. Hence, it is equivalent to the FO(ID) theory of the same
syntactic form.
Relation to the equilibrium logic first-order ASP. There is a formal connection
between ASP-FO D-modules and extensions of ASP to the first-order setting based on
equilibrium logic [18] and the operator SM [8]. We consider the latter two under the
restriction to formulas representing rules of the form (5). In this case, the semantics coincide
if the bodies of rules (5) have no nested occurrences of negation [21]. However, the two
generalizations of ASP differ if nested occurrences are allowed. For instance, the D-module
{P ← ¬¬P} has only ∅ as a model, while in these generalizations also {P} is a model. More
importantly though, they differ at the conceptual level. The logic ASP-FO directly extends
FO. The equilibrium logic version of first-order ASP is based on the quantified logic HT that
differs substantially from FO and, arguably, lacks its direct connection to everyday linguistic
patterns.
5 Informal semantics of ASP-FO and the Generate-Define-Test
methodology
A formal semantics is just a mathematical definition and therefore, by itself, it does not
yet explain how expressions in a logic relate to the real world. For this, also an informal
semantics is needed, i.e., an intuitive interpretation for the logic’s syntactic and semantic
objects. In this paper, we interpret an answer set as a Tarskian representation of a possible
state of the world. The aim of this section is to investigate in detail how the connectives of
ASP should be understood in this new perspective.
It is a common adage in knowledge representation that humans are only able to compre-
hend a large theory if its meaning is composed from the meanings of its components through
a simple and natural semantic composition operator. The most basic composition operator
is simple conjunction. It is the use of this operator that causes FO to be monotonic. The
meaning of an ASP-FO theory is constructed from the meaning of its individual modules by
precisely the same form of conjunction. This is in perfect agreement with our intuition of
modules as imposing constraints on possible worlds, independently from each other. Whatever
analysis remains to be done has then to be concerned with individual modules.
Informal semantics of T-modules/FO sentences. FO sentences express propositions
about an objective world, not about beliefs, intentions, or other propositional attitudes. In
Tarskian model semantics, a structure A serves as a mathematical abstraction of an objective
world. The recursive rules of the definition of truth of a sentence in A (Definition 1) specify
the formal semantics of FO simply by translating each formal connective into an informal
one: ∧ into the natural language “and”, ∨ into “or”, etc. Iterated application of these rules
translates an FO sentence into a natural language sentence that accurately captures its
meaning.
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The existence of this informal semantics does not mean that each FO sentence has
a self-evident meaning. Sentences with three or more nestings of quantifiers are hard to
understand. The material implication ψ ⇒ ϕ also may cause difficulties. Nevertheless,
for a core fragment of FO, sentences have an accurate and reliable informal semantics. For
example, given the informal meaning of the symbols Node and T in the Hamiltonian circuit
example, the informal semantics of
∀x∀y(Node(x) ∧Node(y)⇒ T (x, y))
is the proposition that each node can be reached from every other one.
Informal semantics of choice rules. Choice rules in ASP are often explained in a
computational way, as generators of the search space. Here we propose a declarative
interpretation. The set of ASP choice rules for predicate P
{P (t¯1)} ← ϕ1. . . . {P (t¯n)} ← ϕn.
constitutes a G-module in ASP-FO which can be further translated in
∀x(P (x¯) ⇒ (x¯ = t¯1 ∧ ϕ1) ∨ · · · ∨ (x¯ = t¯n ∧ ϕn))
In the Tarskian possible-world perspective, this sentence says that P is universally false
with exceptions explicitly listed in the consequent of the implication. In other words, a
G-module expresses the local closed world assumption (LCWA) on P , together with an
exception mechanism to relax this LCWA and reinstall the open world assumption (OWA)
on certain parts of the domain. For instance, ∀x∀y(In(x, y) ⇒ Edge(x, y)), the ASP-FO
image of the ASP choice rule {In(x, y)} ← Edge(x, y), states that In(x, y) is false except
when Edge(x, y) is true, in which case In(x, y) might be either true or false.
This analysis of ASP choice rule modules as FO sentences shows that logical connectives
in choice rule bodies, including negation, have their standard FO meaning. However, the
meaning of a choice module as a whole is not composed from the meaning of its individual
rules by monotone conjunction. Instead, adding a rule to a module corresponds to adding a
disjunct to its FO axiom. Hence, the underlying composition operator of this sort of module
is actually anti-monotonic: the module becomes weaker with each rule added. This agrees
with the role of a choice rule as expressing an exception to the LCWA imposed by the module.
The more exceptions there are, the weaker this LCWA.
Informal semantics of D-modules. In the GDT methodology, D-modules serve to define
a set of auxiliary predicates and do so using a rule-based, potentially recursive syntax [12].
Even though current ASP practice tacitly assumes that the stable-model semantics is a
correct semantics for such modules, this is actually far from trivial. As far as we know,
this issue has not yet been addressed in the literature. Our results allow us to present the
following argument to fill this gap.
Informal rule-based definitions (such as Definition 1) abound in mathematics. They
express a precise, objective form of informal knowledge. A formal rule-based definition
construct should match with the informal one. The three most common forms of definitions
in formal sciences are non-inductive definitions, monotone inductive definitions (e.g., transitive
closure) and definitions by induction over a well-founded order (e.g., the definition of |= in
FO, cf. Definition 1). Denecker [2, 3] was first to argue that rules under the well-founded
semantics provide a uniform and correct formalization of these. Later, Denecker et al. [5]
and Denecker and Ternovska [6] extended the original arguments. A full discussion of the
arguments is beyond the scope of this paper but the essence is that an informal inductive
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definition describes how to construct the defined relation by iterated application of rules
and that the well-founded semantics correctly “simulates” this construction for the three
aforementioned forms of definitions.
Not every formal rule set can be understood as a “good” informal inductive definition (i.e.,
one that a formal scientist would accept). In particular, a “good” definition should define for
each object whether it is an element of the defined set or not. In formal terms, this means that
a “good” formal rule set should have a total, i.e., 2-valued, well-founded model. Accordingly,
such definitions are called total [3, 6]. Since parameterized stable and well-founded semantics
coincide for total definitions, the above arguments apply immediately also to total D-modules.
Therefore, the work by Denecker and his coauthors also provides a detailed explanation of why
total D-modules under the stable model semantics correctly formalize the natural language
concept of an inductive definition. To the best of our knowledge, such an explanation has
not yet appeared in print before.
It does not apply to all of ASP, though. First, the analysis by Denecker and co-authors
consistently interprets structures as possible worlds; therefore, our argument does not apply
to the epistemic interpretation of stable models. Second, when we go beyond total D-modules,
the correspondence to FO(ID) breaks down. In FO(ID), such rule sets are unsatisfiable,
whereas in ASP-FO, they may have 0, 1 or more models. How such rule sets can be interpreted
is an open question, but in practice there seems little need for non-total D-modules. Indeed,
D-modules are non-total only in case of cycles over negation. In early applications of ASP,
such cycles over negation were used to encode the generate and test parts of the search
problem. However, more recently, these roles have been taken over by choice rules and
constraints. Consequently, cycles over negation in D-modules have become very rare. In fact,
in the current practice of ASP, D-modules almost always seem to be either positive or to
contain only locally stratified negation. (but see below for an exception).
Comparison with the epistemic view. It is most interesting that the same mathematical
principle can play a very different role depending on whether we take an epistemic or a
possible world view on ASP. Under the stable model semantics, no atom belongs to an
answer set unless it is derived by some rule (in an appropriate cycle-free manner). Under
the epistemic view of an answer set, the informal explanation is that a rational agent should
only believe an atom (or literal) if he has a justification for doing so. In the Tarskian setting,
this explanation does not work, simply because the presence of an atom in an answer set
does not reflect that it is believed but rather that it is true in the possible world. Thus, what
the stable semantics expresses in the Tarskian view is that atoms cannot be true unless
there is a reason for them to be so, which is a form of Closed World Assumption (CWA).
In particular, it is a global CWA on all predicates. Of course, this is a strong assumption
that often needs to be relaxed and this is where choice rules naturally step in. In epistemic
ASP, on the other hand, no implicit CWA is imposed; if CWA is desired it must be stated
explicitly, e.g., by rules ∼P (x¯) ← not P (x¯) involving strong negation [11]. Since there is,
therefore, no implicit global CWA to “open,” the role of choice rules is difficult to explain
in this context. A remarkable conclusion is that the mathematical principle to formalize
rationality in the epistemic view of stable models actually expresses a form of CWA in the
possible world view of stable models. A more detailed discussion on the importance of the
informal semantics of the “models” of a logic program can be found in [4].
The form of CWA implemented by the parameterized stable-model semantics in ASP-FO
differs from other instances of CWA. It is local, i.e., applied only to the defined predicates
Ext(D), and it is also parameterized, in the sense that it is applied given the parameter AP .
For instance, the D-module ({P}, {P ← Q}) imposes CWA on P but it does not entail
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¬P . This is due to the parameter Q, which causes the ASP-FO semantics to admit two
models: if the parameter Q is true, then P can be derived, so {Q,P} is a model; if the
parameter Q is false, then P cannot be derived and, by the CWA, must be false, so ∅ is also a
model. Strikingly, this particular form of CWA, which deviates from standard forms of CWA,
coincides for the important fragment of total D-modules with the precise and well-known
mathematical principle of definition by induction. Whether the form of CWA underlying
D-modules has natural KR applications beyond total definitions is an intriguing question.
Such applications might be found in ASP programs that utilize cycles over negation for
purposes other than to express choices or constraints, e.g., to express causal rules as in [13].
On the nature of negation and rule operator. Taking a possible world view also forces
us to modify our interpretation of negation as failure. The embedding of ASP constraints
and choice rules in FO shows that ASP’s unary rule operator ← for constraints as well as
negation as failure not in such rules are the same as classical negation. As for negation in
D-modules, we started this section by noting that in a Tarskian view, negation cannot be
epistemic. Indeed, let us look at what negation means in informal definitions, for instance,
in the following (informal) rule from our (informal) Definition 1: A, θ |= ¬ψ if A, θ 6|= ψ.
The definition is by structural induction, hence this rule should not be applied before rules
deriving subformulas of ¬ψ. Once this condition is met, the rule derives I, θ |= ¬ϕ when it
is not the case that A, θ |= ψ. This is standard objective negation as formalized by classical
negation in FO.
The difference between a rule ∀x (P (t¯) ← ϕ) in an FO(ID) definition or a D-module
and a material implication ∀x (P (t¯)⇐ ϕ) therefore does not lie in the interpretation of the
connectives of ϕ. Instead, it lies in the rule operator←, which differs from material implication
⇐. Previous studies of inductive definitions called this operator also the production operator,
reflecting its role of producing new elements of the defined relation. As discussed in [7], part
of its meaning is the restriction that such elements should be produced in accordance with
the well-founded order over which the induction is happening. This makes a rule indeed
quite different from a material implication.
6 Discussion
Interpreting the answer-set semantics as a Tarskian possible-world semantics is a major
mental leap which affects our interpretation of the ASP formalism, its composition laws, and
the meaning of its connectives. While many ASP researchers may have already made this
leap in their day-to-day programming under the Generate-Define-Test methodology, this
paper offers the first detailed discussion of its consequences. To conduct our analysis, we
presented the formalism ASP-FO, whose modular structure is geared specifically towards the
GDT paradigm. By studying our possible-world perspective on ASP-FO, we obtained an
informal semantics for the GDT fragment of ASP, which combines modules by means of the
standard conjunction, and captures the roles of different modules in GDT-based programs.
We proposed ASP-FO as a theoretical mechanism to study GDT and ASP from a Tarskian
perspective. However, ASP-FO is also a viable ASP logic for which several efficient ASP tools
exists. Similarly to FO(ID), ASP-FO is an open domain logic and its models can be infinite.
In general, the satisfiability problem is undecidable (and not just co-semidecidable) — the
result can be obtained by adapting the corresponding result concerning the logic FO(ID) [6].
In many search problems, however, a finite domain is given. That opens a way to practical
problem solving. One can apply finite Herbrand model generation or model expansion [15]
and the corresponding tools [1]. Also, the IDP system [23] implements both the FO(ID) and
ASP-FO semantics.
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Finally, let us put the goals of this paper in a broader historical perspective. First, both
logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning were anti-theses to classical logic (FO),
motivated by respectively computational and representational issues with the latter. The
work on ASP-FO and earlier on FO(ID) effectively presents a synthesis of these paradigms
with FO. Second, the view of logic programs as definitions was already present in Clark’s
view, albeit implicitly, and his completion semantics is not fully adequate to formalize this
idea. Later, Gelfond and Lifschitz proposed to interpret logic programs as epistemic theories.
The view on D-modules presented in this paper is a proposal to “backtrack” to Clark’s
original view.
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